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Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, 
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record* 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
This Article contributes to the development of an originalist 
methodology by making the case for an approach that employs three 
distinct methods, each of which serves as a basis for confirming or 
questioning the results reached by the other two. This approach will be 
called the Method of Triangulation. The three component techniques 
are as follows:  
1. The Method of Corpus Linguistics: The method of corpus 
linguistics employs large-scale data sets (corpora) that provide 
evidence of linguistic practice. 
2. The Originalist Method of Immersion: The method of 
immersion requires researchers to immerse themselves in the 
linguistic and conceptual world of the authors and readers of the 
constitutional provision being studied. 
3. The Method of Studying the Constitutional Record: The 
method of studying the record framing, ratification, and 
implementation requires the researcher to examine the drafting 
process, including sources upon which the drafters relied, debates 
during the drafting and ratification process, and the early 
history of implementation of the constitutional provision. 
These three methods each provide different inputs into the process of 
constitutional interpretation and construction. Because each method 
 
 *  Copyright 2017 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce this 
Article in whole or in part, including the distribution of multiple copies and posting in 
electronic form. The author requests that all copies include a citation to this publication in the 
B.Y.U. Law Review. 
 **  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe 
thanks to Evan Bernick, Anne Fleming, Brian Galle, Greg Klass, David Luban, Jennifer 
Mascott, Deborah Sills, Neel Sukhatme, Joshua Teitelbaum, William Treanor, Carlos Vasquez, 
and Robin West (the participants in Faculty Workshop at Georgetown University Law Center) 
for comments on prior drafts. 
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can be checked against the others, the combination of the three methods 
results in what can be called “triangulation.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Originalism aims to recover the original meaning of the 
constitutional text and then put that meaning into practice. How can 
this aim be achieved? A complete theory of originalist interpretation 
requires the articulation of an interpretive methodology—a set of 
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guidelines and practices that maximize the likelihood of accurately 
recovering the original meaning of the constitutional text: we can 
call a set of such guidelines and practices originalist methodology. 
Ideally, such a methodology would be objective and replicable and 
hence would result in intersubjective agreement on original 
meaning. If disagreements persist despite the application of the 
methods, the reasons for disagreement should be transparent and 
subject to assessment and debate by judges, advocates, and scholars. 
This Article contributes to the development of an originalist 
methodology by making the case for an approach that employs three 
distinct methods, each of which serves as a basis for confirming or 
questioning the results reached by the other two. This approach will 
be called the Method of Triangulation. The three component 
techniques are as follows: 
• The Method of Corpus Linguistics: The method of corpus 
linguistics employs large-scale data sets (corpora) that 
provide evidence of linguistic practice.1 
• The Originalist Method of Immersion: The method of 
immersion requires researchers to immerse themselves in the 
linguistic and conceptual world of the authors and readers of 
the constitutional provision being studied.2 
• The Method of Studying the Constitutional Record: The 
method of studying the record framing, ratification, and 
implementation requires the researcher to examine 
the  drafting process, including sources upon which the 
drafters  relied, debates during the drafting and ratification 
process,  and the early history of implementation of the 
constitutional  provision.3 
 
 1.  See infra Part IV. 
 2.  See infra Part V. 
 3.  See infra Part VI. The record of framing, ratification, and implementation overlaps 
with the “legislative history” of a constitutional provision. I do not use the phrase “legislative 
history” for three reasons: first, that phrase is closely connected to an intentionalist approach 
to interpretation; second, the method that I am describing includes materials that precede the 
drafting process and hence come before the start of the normal definition of “legislative 
history;” and, third, this method includes implementation history which starts after the 
legislative history concludes. 
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These three methods each provide different inputs into the process 
of constitutional interpretation and construction. Because each 
method can be checked against the others, the combination of the 
three methods results in what can be called “triangulation.” 
Ideally, triangulation would yield consilience—agreement 
between each of the three methods. When consilience is obtained, 
the Method of Triangulation provides strong evidence of original 
meaning. This evidence is even stronger when the results produced 
by the individual methods are replicated by independent researchers. 
When the methods disagree or when one method produces different 
results when employed by different researchers, further investigation 
may be required or the conflict between methods and researchers 
may be resolved by weighing the evidence or providing an 
explanation that resolves an apparent disagreement. 
This Article investigates the Method of Triangulation from the 
perspective of public meaning originalism. Part I provides a brief 
introduction to public meaning priginalism. Part II lays out an 
account of public meaning as “communicative content” and explores 
the role of both semantics and context in the production of the 
original meaning of the constitutional text. Part III briefly surveys 
some of the difficulties with reliance on contemporary linguistic 
intuitions and dictionary definitions from the relevant period. Parts 
IV, V, and VI provide an account of the three component tools for 
investigating original meaning: corpus linguistics, immersion, and 
the record of framing, ratification, and implementation. Part VII lays 
out the Method of Triangulation. Part VIII connects the Method of 
Triangulation to the central aim of interpretation—to provide a 
translation of the constitutional text from the American English of 
the relevant period into contemporary American English. Part IX 
provides a brief discussion of various problems of implementation, 
including the role of triangulation in the courts. The Conclusion 
provides a brief summary. 
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM 
“Public meaning originalism” is a member of the originalist 
family of constitutional theories. Almost all originalists agree on 
two  ideas:4 
• The Fixation Thesis: The linguistic meaning or comm-
unicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the 
time each provision is framed and ratified.5 
• The Constraint Principle: Constitutional practice, including 
the decision of constitutional cases and the judicial articu-
lation of constitutional doctrines, should be constrained by 
the original meaning of the constitutional text.6 
The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed, and that fixed 
meaning is binding on constitutional actors, including judges, 
presidents and other executive officials, and members of legislative 
bodies. The claim made by the Fixation Thesis is empirical or factual: 
given the way language works, the communicative content of a 
writing is fixed at the time of drafting. The claim made by the 
Constraint Principle is normative: as a matter of political morality, 
constitutional actors ought to be bound by the fixed original 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
Although originalists almost all agree on fixation and constraint, 
they disagree on other matters. One disagreement concerns the 
nature of original meaning. The range of views on this question 
include the following: 
• Public Meaning Originalism: The original meaning of the 
constitutional text is the meaning that the text had for “We 
the People,” the citizens who constituted the United States. 
 
 4.  For a collection of sources supporting the claim that originalists agree on fixation 
and constraint, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in 
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 n.28 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The 
Fixation Thesis]. 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Con-
stitutional Practice (Mar. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available online at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215). 
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• Original Intentions Originalism: The original meaning of the 
constitutional text is the meaning that the framers intended 
to convey. 
• Ratifiers’ Understandings Originalism: The original meaning 
of the constitutional text is the meaning conveyed to the 
ratifiers of each provision. 
• Original Methods Originalism: The original meaning of the 
constitutional text is the meaning produced by application of 
the original methods of constitutional interpretation and 
construction to the text. 
• Original Law Originalism: The law in effect at the time the 
Constitution was ratified is legally binding unless it was 
changed by methods authorized by the original law. 
Although different versions of originalism may produce different 
outcomes at the margins, it seems likely that they will converge when 
applied to most of the constitutional text. Because the framers 
intended to communicate to the public and the ratifiers were 
members of the public, the first three forms of originalism are likely 
to produce identical results except in cases where there was a failure 
of constitutional communication. The versions of originalism that 
focus on original methods and original law may diverge more 
substantially, because these theories do not accept the idea that the 
constitutional text was written to be accessible to “We the People.”7 
Because of the difference between and among originalists, we 
can distinguish between two modes of originalist theory and 
practice. The first mode is “sectarian”: sectarian originalism adopts a 
particular version of originalism, for example, public meaning 
originalism. The second mode is “ecumenical”: ecumenical 
originalism aims to develop theories and engage in practice that is 
neutral on the questions about which originalists disagree. This 
Article is primarily an exercise in sectarian originalism, argued from 
 
 7.  The relationship between public meaning originalism and original methods requires 
extended discussion, but the divergence between these approaches should not be exaggerated. 
Public meaning originalism recognizes that some provisions of the Constitution have technical 
legal meanings; for this reason, the cases where original methods and original law provide the 
most distinctive meanings can be incorporated via the notion of a publicly accessible meaning 
and the division of linguistic labor. 
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the perspective of public meaning originalism; the case for the claim 
that public meaning originalism offers the best theory of originalism 
is not made here but is the subject of work in progress.8 
Nonetheless, the Method of Triangulation will be relevant to the 
recovery of the intentions of the framers, the understandings of the 
ratifiers, or any other form of original meaning. Corpus linguistics, 
immersion, and the record of framing, ratification, and 
implementation—all of these constituent methods can be applied to 
recovery of original meanings as conceived differently by different 
versions of originalism. 
Some originalists embrace the interpretation-construction distin-
ction,9 which can be stated as follows: 
• Interpretation: Constitutional interpretation is the activity 
that discovers the communicative content of the constitu-
tional text. 
• Construction: Constitutional construction is the activity that 
determines the legal effect of the constitutional text, 
including the decision of constitutional cases and the legal 
content of constitutional doctrines. 
Although the interpretation-construction distinction can and should 
be embraced by all originalists, some originalists may prefer to use 
the terms interpretation and construction synonymously, using other 
vocabulary to describe these two distinct concepts. 
Originalists differ on other questions, including the extent to 
which the constitutional text is underdeterminate. Some originalists 
believe that at least some provisions of the constitutional text create 
substantial “construction zones,” because these provisions are vague 
or open textured.10 Other originalists believe that the text is almost 
fully determinate; such determinacy might result from application 
of the original methods of constitutional interpretation and 
 
 8.  Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (Nov. 28, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis]. 
 9.  Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 10.  Other construction zones may be created if the text is irreducibly ambiguous or if 
the text has gaps or contradictions. 
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construction or it might result from the application of default rules, 
for example, a rule that requires deference to democratic institutions 
when the text is not clear. 11 
II. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING AS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE 
COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT 
A complete originalist theory must offer a theory and 
methodology of both interpretation and construction, but this 
Article is concerned with the methods by which constitutional actors 
and scholars can discover the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text. In other words, the Method of Triangulation 
provides guidance for originalist constitutional interpretation. 
Originalists must also provide an originalist account of constitutional 
construction, but that topic is outside the scope of this Article.12 
This Part provides a brief summary of the theory of meaning 
adopted by public meaning originalism. The summary is brief and 
incomplete because a full account would require a deep dive into 
theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language. The aim here 
is simply to lay out the assumptions upon which the 
methodology  rests—not to provide the arguments or authority for 
those  assumptions.13 
A. The Situation of Constitutional Communication 
The basic premise of public meaning originalism is that the 
authors of each constitutional provision intended to communicate 
content to “We the People,” the body of citizens that constitute the 
polity of the United States. In other words, the constitutional text 
was intended to be accessible to the public.  
 
 11.  Cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (arguing for the relative determinacy of the constitutional text and 
against the claim that the meaning of many constitutional provisions is general and abstract). 
 12.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (discussing originalist approaches to constitutional 
construction) [hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construction]. 
 13.  In due course, public meaning originalists must provide justifications for their 
account of public meaning. My own version of such a justification will be provided in Solum, 
The Public Meaning Thesis, supra note 8. 
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To achieve this goal, the authors of the text were required to 
write in a way that would enable public comprehension of the text. 
Comprehension of the text by the public requires what we can call 
“public accessibility”—the communicative content of the text must 
be accessible by citizens, the group that constitutes the polity and 
hence the relevant segment of the population. A text has 
“unmediated public accessibility” if it can be read and understood by 
members of the public with reasonable effort. If the text employs 
technical language (terms of art), it may nonetheless be accessible. 
The accessibility of clauses that employ the specialized vocabulary of 
a linguistic subcommunity (such as lawyers) requires that two 
conditions be satisfied: (1) the technical language must be 
recognizable as such, and (2) the technical meaning must be 
accessible using reasonable effort. If these two conditions 
are satisfied, it results in what can be called “mediated 
public  accessibility.”14 
The goal of conveying the communicative content of the 
constitutional text to “We the People” is achieved if all of the 
constitutional text satisfies the conditions for mediated or 
unmediated public accessibility. Notice that public accessibility does 
not require that each and every member of the public read and 
understand the constitutional text. When a particular constitutional 
provision is proposed, debated, and ratified, it is likely only a fraction 
of the public will actually read the text. Other members of the public 
may read secondary accounts, and those accounts may quote and 
explain the meaning of some of the provisions. Just as a highway is 
publicly accessible, even if some members of the public never use it, 
so too, the constitutional text is publicly accessible, even if some 
members of the public never read and comprehend it. 
To achieve the goal of communicating constitutional content to 
the public via the text, the authors of each constitutional provision 
necessarily had to use the tools at hand, the transmission of meaning 
via a text in the context of constitutional communication. 
Simplifying, we can say that the constitutional text conveys meaning 
via two sets of tools: (1) semantic tools, including the conventional 
 
 14.  Some citizens were not native speakers of English and some of those citizens may 
not have been sufficiently proficient in English to read and comprehend the Constitution. 
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semantic meanings of the words and phrases the regularities of 
syntax, grammar, and punctuation that allow words and phrases to 
be combined into meaningful units, and (2) contextual tools, 
including the ability to disambiguate words and phrases with 
multiple meanings and to enrich the semantic content of the text. 
B. The Role of Conventional Semantic Meaning 
Words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings, 
determined by patterns of usage. Lexicographers report these 
conventional semantic meanings in dictionary definitions, but such 
definitions are secondary evidence of patterns of usage.15 Given the 
assumption that the constitutional text is intended to convey content 
to the public, the authors of the text were required to employ 
publicly accessible semantics if they were to achieve the goal of 
conveying meaning to the public. 
The most basic component of publicly accessible semantics is 
what lawyers call “literal meaning”—the meaning that a text would 
have if interpreted to have only that meaning yielded by the 
conventional semantic meanings of the words and phrases as 
combined by syntax, grammar, and punctuation. Literal meaning is 
acontextual; it does not take the role of context in the production of 
communicative content into account. One can imagine 
communicative situations in which the context of communication is 
very thin, and hence, the author of a text would be required to rely 
almost entirely on semantics. For example, the author of a “message 
in a bottle” would know that the reader of the message would have 
very little information about the context in which the message was 
written. If the message itself did not provide information about the 
context of drafting, then the author would be required to rely almost 
entirely on literal meanings. 
Some words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings 
that are widely or even almost universally shared within a linguistic 
community. But there are also “terms of art,” words or phrases that 
have meanings within a linguistic subcommunity. For example, 
 
 15.  See generally BO SVENSÉN, A HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF DICTIONARY-MAKING (2009) (describing the methods of lexicography). 
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Article I, Section VIII grants Congress power to “grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal,”16 but it may well be that the phrase “Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal” would have been familiar to maritime 
lawyers, sea captains, and those involved in maritime commerce, but 
not to members of the general public. Terms of art involve a division 
of linguistic labor; usage by a linguistic subcommunity determines 
the conventional semantic meanings of specialized or technical 
vocabulary.17 Public meaning originalism can account for terms of art 
via the notion of publicly accessible meaning;18 more precisely, terms 
of art are publicly accessible via the mechanisms identified by the 
notion of mediated public meaning. For example, a farmer in 
Massachusetts who read the proposed Constitution of the United 
States might realize that “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” was a 
technical term and consult an expert (an admiralty lawyer or sea 
captain) about its meaning. 
C. The Role of Context 
The full communicative content of the constitutional text is not 
reducible to its literal meaning. This is because of the role that 
context plays in clarifying and enriching the communicative content 
conveyed by both oral and written communication. In the 
philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the role of context 
is described as “pragmatic” and “pragmatics” is contrasted to 
“semantics.”19 In the discussion that follows, I will use “context” and 
“contextual” in order to avoid confusion of “linguistic pragmatics” 
 
 16.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 17.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 409, 429–31 (2009). The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually 
attributed to Hilary Putnam. See Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in 7 LANGUAGE, 
MIND AND KNOWLEDGE (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975), reprinted in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND 
REALITY 215, 227 (1st ed. 1975); Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic Labor and Speaker 
Competence, 34 PHIL. STUD. 37, 37 (1978). 
 18.  In addition, there are words and phrases that are ambiguous with both public 
meanings and technical meanings. For example, the phrase “declare war” may have both a 
generally understood meaning that is relatively thin and thicker more technical meanings. I am 
grateful to William Treanor for this point. The question as to how public meaning originalism 
should handle cases of “public-meaning versus technical meaning ambiguity” is a difficult one 
and is outside the scope of this Article. 
 19.  See generally ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS (3d. ed. 2011). 
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with “legal pragmatism,” which is an unrelated position in general 
legal theory.20 
1. Contextual disambiguation 
The first role that context plays in communication relates to 
ambiguity. The word ambiguity is sometimes used to mean 
something like “the absence of clarity,” but it also has a more precise 
and technical meaning that contrasts ambiguity with vagueness and 
open texture. In this technical sense, the word ambiguity refers to the 
multiplicity of possible meanings.21 Thus, the word cool has a sense 
related to temperature (as in, “the room is cool”), another sense 
related to personal style (as in, “Miles Davis was cool”), and a third 
sense relating to temperament (as in, “he kept his cool”). 
Acontextually, the word cool is ambiguous, but in each of the 
supplied examples, cool is disambiguated by context and readers are 
easily able to glean the relevant sense. 
Many of the words and phrases that make up the constitutional 
text would be ambiguous if they were read acontextually, but once 
context is taken into account, the meaning becomes clear, as in the 
following examples: 
• Acontextually, the word Senate in Article I might refer to the 
Roman Senate, but in context, it clearly refers to the United 
States Senate as one of the two houses of Congress. 
• Acontextually, the word State as used in many constitutional 
provisions might refer to the condition of some thing or 
person, but in context it clearly refers to the constituent 
political units of the United States, for example, 
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. 
• Acontextually, the word arms as used in the Second 
Amendment might refer to human appendages, but in 
context it clearly refers to weapons that can be carried. 
 
 20.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 21.  Sometimes the word polysemy is used to refer to what I call “ambiguity.” On the 
relationship of ambiguity, polysemy, and vagueness, see David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and 
Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 273 (1993). 
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These examples are all obvious, and may seem trivial, but their very 
obviousness demonstrates the power of contextual disambiguation. 
2. Contextual (pragmatic) enrichment 
Pragmatic or contextual enrichment is the mechanism by which 
authors can convey content to readers without making that content 
explicit. The mechanisms of contextual enrichment are intuitively 
accessible to competent language users. Consider four forms of 
contextual enrichment. 
a. Implicature. The word implicature was coined by Paul Grice 
to refer to the ability of speakers to convey content without explicit 
statement.22 For example, a law professor might write a letter for a 
student applying for a judicial clerkship that said only the following: 
I recommend Alice to you. She attended class regularly and was 
always on time. 
This letter makes no explicit negative statements about Alice; the 
literal meaning is entirely positive. But in the context of a letter of 
recommendation, these statements are quite negative because they 
imply that the best that can be said for Alice does not include the 
attributes required of an excellent judicial clerk, including brilliance, 
analytic ability, diligence, and so forth. If the best that can be said 
about Alice is that she was on time and did not miss class, the 
implicature is that the recommender does not believe that she would 
be a good choice for the position of law clerk. 
It is not clear that the United States Constitution contains any 
implicatures of the kind just identified. Sometimes the word 
implicature is used in a broad sense that would include phenomenon 
that are discussed below as impliciture or presupposition and the 
Constitution does include implicatures in this broad sense of 
the  word. 
b. Impliciture. The word impliciture was coined by Kent Bach to 
refer to a form of contextual enrichment that is distinct from 
“implicature.”23 The word ellipses is sometimes used to refer to the 
 
 22.  See Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/implicature/ (last updated June 24, 2014). 
 23.  Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124 (1994). 
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same phenomenon. The following examples are given by Bach, with 
the impliciture made explicit in the bracketed text: 
• Jack and Jill are married [to each other]. 
• Bill insulted his boss and [as a result] got fired. 
• Nina has had enough [pasta to eat].24 
Thus, if someone says, “Bill insulted his boss and got fired,” the 
implicit [as a result] is unstated but nonetheless communicated to 
the audience. The audience infers that the speaker intended to 
connect the two events causally. 
One example of constitutional impliciture is contained in Article 
I, Section 9, which states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law 
shall be passed,”25 with [by Congress] as an impliciture. Read 
acontextually, the Ex Post Facto Clause might prohibit the passage 
of such laws by state or foreign governments, but the surrounding 
context of Section 9 makes it clear that the prohibition applies only 
to Congress. Section 10 uses the phrase “[n]o state shall”26 to 
articulate restrictions on the several states. Section 9 omits explicit 
identification of the entity to which several of its restrictions apply, 
but its placement in Article I, which concerns Congress,27 and the 
juxtaposition with Section 10, operate to create the impliciture that 
several of the Section 10 restrictions apply only to Congress. 
c. Presupposition. Another form of contextual enrichment is called 
“presupposition.” Presupposition operates to convey communicative 
content that is not explicitly stated but that is presupposed by what is 
said in a particular context.28 Consider the following examples: 
• Utterance: “Cass is no longer the head of OIRA.” 
Presupposition: “Cass was once the head of OIRA.” 
 
 24.  Kent Bach, Impliciture vs. Explicature: What’s the Difference? (unpublished 
manuscript) (available online at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/Bach.ImplExpl.pdf). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 26.  Id. art. I, § 10. 
 27.  See id. art. I, § 1. 
 28.  See, e.g., Philippe Schlenker, Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition 
Projection, 34 THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 157 (2008); Bas C. van Fraassen, Presupposition, 
Implication, and Self-Reference, 65 J. PHIL. 136 (1968); David I. Beaver & Bart Geurts, 
Presupposition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (April 1, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/presupposition/. 
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• Utterance: “Adrian should not eat meat.” Presupposition: 
“Adrian does eat meat.” 
• Utterance: “Lisa’s wife is pregnant.” Presupposition: “Lisa 
has a wife.” 
In each of the examples, the presupposed content is communicated 
by the utterance—even though it is not stated explicitly. 
Presuppositions take various forms. We might distinguish 
between “conversational presuppositions” (also called “speaker 
presuppositions” or “pragmatic presuppositions”) and “conventional 
presuppositions” (or “semantic presuppositions”). Conventional 
presuppositions are triggered by particular words or phrases; in the 
first example above, the phrase “no longer” triggers the 
presupposition that Cass was once the head of OIRA. For our 
purposes, we can put these technicalities to the side. 
The constitutional text may have a variety of presuppositions. 
The most famous example is the Ninth Amendment, which reads: 
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”29 
The text does not explicitly state that there are rights that are 
retained by the people, but because it would make no sense to 
prohibit constructions that deny or disparage nonexistent rights, the 
existence of retained rights is a presupposition communicated by the 
Ninth Amendment. 
d. Modulation. Finally, consider what is sometimes called 
modulation. The intuitive idea is that, in context, a conventional 
semantic meaning can be adjusted or modulated to fit the context—
essentially a new meaning is created (sometimes on the spot) so that 
an old word is used in a new way. As Francois Recanati observes,  
Sense modulation is essential to speech, because we use a (more or 
less) fixed stock of lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of 
things, situations and experiences. Through the interaction 
between the context-independent meanings of our words and the 
particulars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated 
senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand.30 
 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 30.  FRANCOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 131 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
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In ordinary speech, modulations may be “one-offs,” used on a single 
occasion. But in the law, modulation can create a new technical 
meaning for a word that also has an ordinary sense. 
The Constitution contains a variety of modulations—special 
purpose constitutional meanings that can be understood by paying 
attention to context. One example is (or hypothetically may be) the 
Recess Appointments Clause, which uses the word recess.31 Read 
acontextually, a recess might be any break in the business of the 
Senate—even a lunch break. But in context, recess is best read as a 
modulation, the meaning of which plays off the complementary term 
session. The relevant sense of recess is a modulation of the 
conventional semantic meaning; it is limited to the break between 
sessions of the Senate. 
Finally, there is a residual category of “free enrichments” that do 
not fit into any of these categories. For present purposes, the 
category of free enrichment is set aside.32 
D. Distinguishing Expected Applications from Original Meaning 
Original public meaning should be distinguished from what have 
been called “original expected application[s].”33 The meaning of a 
text is one thing; expectations about how the text will or should be 
applied to particular cases or issues is another. Thus, the framers and 
ratifiers of the Second Amendment may have expected that the 
“right to . . . bear Arms” would be applied to muskets and flintlocks, 
but the meaning of arms is more general and would encompass 
modern weapons.34 Public meaning originalism affirms the 
Constraint Principle with respect to the public meaning of the 
constitutional text and not the application expectations of the 
framers, ratifiers, or public at the time a constitutional provision 
went into effect. 
Although original expected applications do not constitute the 
original meaning of the constitutional text, they are nonetheless 
 
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 32.  NICHOLAS ALLOTT, KEY TERMS IN PRAGMATICS 80 (2010). 
 33.  Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–
26 (2007). 
 34.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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relevant to constitutional interpretation because they can provide 
evidence of the original public meaning. Thus, if the framers believed 
that muskets and flintlocks were “arms” within the meaning of the 
Second Amendment, that fact is evidence that favors any theory of 
the meaning of arms that encompasses muskets and flintlocks and is 
evidence that disfavors any interpretation that would exclude them. 
Application expectations may frequently be important or even 
decisive evidence favoring or disfavoring a hypothesis regarding 
original meaning. For example, the hypothesis that arms in the 
Second Amendment refers to limbs attached to the upper body of 
humans would be inconsistent with evidence that the framers of that 
provision expected it to apply to muskets and flintlock pistols—
which are clearly not limbs.  
In addition, there are cases where application expectations are 
incorrect and hence where evidence of the expectations does not 
provide good evidence of meaning. The clearest example of this kind 
of case would be the situation where the expectation was based on a 
false belief about the facts. To take a very simple example, if the 
members of the Philadelphia Convention had a false belief about the 
age of a potential presidential candidate, such that the individual 
would not have been eligible for election to the presidency in 1782 
(because the individual was actually thirty-two and not thirty-six), 
the expectation that the Article II requirement that the President be 
thirty-five years of age would be satisfied does not provide evidence 
that the phrase “the age of thirty five years” had some weird 
meaning such that thirty-five years actually meant “thirty 
two  years.”35 The factual error fully explains the erroneous 
application  belief. 
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH LINGUISTIC INTUITIONS 
AND DICTIONARIES 
Contemporary readers of the Constitution have pre-reflective 
beliefs about the meanings of the words and phrases that make up 
the text; these beliefs are called “linguistic intuitions.” Similarly, the 
words in the constitutional text are defined in dictionaries, both 
 
 35.  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
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contemporary dictionaries and dictionaries from the historical 
periods in which the various provisions of the text were authored. 
We can imagine a naïve approach to originalist research that relied 
on contemporary linguistic intuitions and various dictionaries as the 
primary method for discovering the conventional semantic meanings 
of the words and phrases that make up the constitutional text.36 
But an intuition-and-dictionary–based methodology for dis-
covering the meaning of the constitutional text is problematic for a 
variety of reasons. Before we turn to the constituent elements of the 
Method of Triangulation, we can identify some of the problems with 
the intuition-and-dictionary approach. 
Contemporary linguistic intuitions work well in determining the 
conventional semantic meanings of words and phrases in a text when 
the individual who is doing the interpreting has intuitions that are 
based on patterns of usage observed during a period that coincides 
with the writing of the text. Thus, the linguistic intuitions of an 
adult native speaker of American English in 2017 are likely to be an 
accurate guide to a text written in 2017 and several years before or 
after that date. But in the case of the constitutional text, many 
provisions are quite old. The most recent provisions to be drafted are 
the Twenty-Third through the Twenty-Sixth Amendments—which 
were proposed between 1960 and 1971. These four amendments 
were drafted at a time when many, but not all, contemporary 
interpreters were alive. The Twenty-Second Amendment was 
proposed in 1947—when the oldest serving Justice (as of this 
writing), Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was about fourteen years old. All the 
remaining provisions of the Constitution were drafted before any 
currently serving Justice was born. Of course, many lawyers, judges, 
and legal scholars were born after 1971. Justice Gorsuch was only 
four years of age when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was proposed. 
Because of the phenomenon of linguistic drift (or semantic shift), 
contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the 
conventional semantic meanings of older provisions of the 
constitutional text. Consider the following examples of words or 
 
 36.  The use of contemporary meaning is not necessarily naïve. Judges might 
deliberately substitute contemporary meanings for original meanings in order to amend the 
Constitution through linguistic subterfuge. 
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phrases in the constitutional text where contemporary linguistic 
intuitions would be a poor guide to the original meaning: 
• Domestic violence in Article IV: The contemporary meaning 
of the phrase is something like “violence within the family, 
including spousal abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse,” but 
the original meaning was likely “violence within a state, 
including riots, insurrections, and rebellions.”37 
• Dollar in the Seventh Amendment: The contemporary 
meaning of the word is the Federal Reserve Note issued by 
the United States Treasury, but the original meaning was 
likely the Spanish silver dollar, understood as a unit of hard 
currency defined by silver content.38 
• Science in Article I: The contemporary meaning of the word 
is usually limited to the so-called hard sciences such as 
physics, chemistry, and biology, but the original meaning was 
systematic knowledge and would have included the 
humanities, including history, philosophy, and theology.39 
• The number characteristic of verbs following the phrase 
United States in many clauses: The contemporary 
punctuation practice suggests that the use of the plural form 
 
 37.  See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 4, at 16 (“The contemporary semantic 
meaning of ‘domestic violence’ is ‘‘’intimate partner abuse,’ ‘battering,’ or ‘wife-beating,’’’ and 
it is understood to be ‘physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse that takes place in 
the context of an intimate relationship, including marriage.’”). 
 38.  Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 281–82 
(2017) (“[A]n otherwise-excellent student note on the Seventh Amendment’s ‘Twenty Dollars 
Clause’ makes the mistaken assumption that the word ‘dollar’ refers to the contemporary 
Federal Reserve note, when in fact the word ‘dollar’ almost certainly referred to the Spanish 
silver dollar weighing 416 grains and possibly other dollars with closely approximate silver 
content.” (citations omitted)). 
 39.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) (“The tendency of modern usage is to associate 
the term ‘science’ with the natural sciences, such as chemistry, physics, and biology. These are 
understood as the ‘hard sciences’ and as the exemplary or paradigm cases of science. Even a 
systematic and formal body of knowledge, such as geometry, mathematics, or symbolic logic, 
might be thought to be science in only a loose or derivative sense. To the extent this is a 
feature of modern usage, however, it does not conform to the understanding of the term 
‘science’ in the founding era. Rather, there is general agreement that science was usually 
understood in a broader sense, so as to include knowledge, especially systematic or grounded 
knowledge of enduring value. Thus, the meanings of ‘learning’ and ‘science’ would be closely 
related.” (footnotes omitted)). 
10.SOLUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:12 PM 
1621 Triangulating Public Meaning 
 1641 
of verbs means that the United States refers to a collection of 
states rather than one nation, but the eighteenth-century 
grammar frequently used plural forms after singular nouns 
ending in the letter s.40 In this example, it is grammar rather 
than semantics that has changed.41 
Because semantics, syntax, and punctuation change over time, 
contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the 
meaning of older texts. 
This problem also exists for constitutional phrases of art. For 
example, the phrase “freedom of the press” has a contemporary 
meaning for lawyers that is shaped by the decisional law of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but there is at least a strong possibility that the 
original meaning was a much narrower technical meaning that 
restricted the freedom of the press to a rule against the licensing of 
printing presses and prior restraints.42 
There is another obvious problem with linguistic intuitions. 
Scholars and judges may form the intention to be objective and 
neutral when they consult their linguistic intuitions about the 
meaning of constitutional words and phrases, but they may have 
strong beliefs about what the constitutional language “ought to 
mean.” The influence of these beliefs on their intuitions may not be 
fully transparent to the interpreters themselves; in other words, they 
may not recognize the role of their own biases and preconceptions. 
Those who engage in the interpretation of legal texts may engage in 
 
 40.  William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original 
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 489 (2007) (“Justice 
Thomas, Professor Amar, and others have assigned critical interpretive weight to the fact that, 
‘[i]n the Constitution, after all, “the United States” is consistently a plural noun.’ This 
grammar would appear to suggest that the Constitution reflects the view that the United States 
is a collection of states rather than one nation. What this reading misses, however, is the fact 
that in the late eighteenth century, nouns ending in the letter s were commonly assigned plural 
verbs, regardless of whether or not the noun itself was plural.” (footnote omitted)). 
 41.  I am grateful to William Treanor for this example. 
 42.  Discussion of the relevant history is far beyond the scope of this article. See 
generally David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 160 (2001) (“Until the last 
decade of the seventeenth century, both Parliament and English kings relied upon licensing to 
control the press.”). 
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“motivated reasoning.”43 Lawyers are required to make the best 
reasonable case for the interpretation that favors their client, and 
they are subject to the same problems of bias and preconception that 
affect judges and scholars. 
Some of the problems with dictionaries are different from and 
some are related to the problems with linguistic intuitions. 
Dictionaries are not written to influence the outcome of 
constitutional disputes and hence are unlikely to suffer from the 
motivated reasoning problem. Contemporary dictionaries are 
primarily intended to report current usage—although the Oxford 
English Dictionary provides extensive examples of usage with dates, 
which sometimes can be used to reconstruct the meanings that 
existed at the time a particular constitutional provision was drafted. 
What about period dictionaries? There are two dictionaries that 
are used with some frequency in reconstructing the meaning of the 
early provisions of the Constitution—the unamended text and the 
first twelve amendments. The first of these is A Dictionary of the 
English Language, which was authored by Samuel Johnson. Johnson 
did the work on his dictionary by himself over a nine-year period; his 
dictionary was published in 1755.44 Johnson’s dictionary reports 
English usage in Great Britain from a period that ended thirty-two 
years before the drafting of the United States Constitution in 1787. 
The second dictionary is Noah Webster’s 1828 American 
Dictionary of the English Language. Webster borrowed from 
Johnson; he completed his dictionary over an eighteen-year period.45 
Although Webster’s dictionary reports American English, it was 
published thirty-eight years after the Philadelphia Convention. 
The ideal dictionary would report American usage in the late 
eighteenth century, but neither Samuel Johnson’s nor Noah 
Webster’s hits this precise target. Nonetheless, both dictionaries 
provide some relevant evidence of conventional semantic meanings 
 
 43.  On the general idea of motivated reasoning, see Milton Lodge & Charles Taber, 
Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: 
COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY (Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. 
McCubbins, & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 2000). 
 44.  See W. JACKSON BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON 240–60 (1975). 
 45.  See JOSHUA KENDALL, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER: NOAH WEBSTER’S 
OBSESSION AND THE CREATION OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE (2010). 
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of the early provisions of the constitutional text. Neither dictionary is 
perfect. Either dictionary could misreport the conventional semantic 
meanings of its era. Either dictionary could omit a meaning that was 
the relevant public meaning of a constitutional provision once 
context is taken into account. Neither dictionary provides primary 
evidence of the patterns of usage that constitute conventional 
semantic meaning. 
Both contemporary linguistic intuitions and dictionaries have a 
role to play in originalist research, but there are good reasons to 
search for better methods. In the three Parts that follow, this Article 
investigates corpus linguistics, immersion, and the record of framing, 
ratification, and implementation as constituent elements of the 
Method of Triangulation. Once that investigation is complete, we 
will turn to the Method of Triangulation itself. 
IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
The core of the method of corpus linguistics is the use of data 
sets (corpora) and search engines to identify primary evidence of the 
patterns of usage. After describing corpus methods, this Part will 
discuss corpus lexicography, the use of corpus linguistics 
in identifying historical patterns of usage that constitute 
conventional semantic meanings. A second use of corpus linguistics 
involves the identification of collocates (neighboring words); this 
technique  provides a tool that can aid the process of contextual 
disambiguation. Finally, the relationship between corpus linguistics 
and contextual enrichment will be briefly discussed. 
A. A Brief Description 
Corpus linguistics is the name for an approach to investigating 
linguistic phenomena. The approach involves large datasets, called 
“corpora,” that can be searched using a variety of techniques 
including key word in context (KWIC) searches and searches that 
identify “collocates” (words used in proximity with the search term). 
Most dictionaries are compiled using very selective and limited 
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datasets,46 but corpus lexicography allows the investigation of word 
meaning using large datasets that can represent a wide variety 
of  sources. 
Recently, corpus lexicography has begun to play a role in the 
interpretation of legal texts. Following Stephen Mouritsen’s 
important article, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional 
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning,47 the 
pioneering judicial opinion was a concurrence by Associate Chief 
Justice Lee of the Utah Supreme Court.48 Corpus lexicography was 
utilized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Harris.49 
There is a growing body of legal scholarship exploring and using 
corpus techniques,50 including an important forthcoming article co-
authored by Justice Lee and Stephen Mouritsen.51 The use of corpus 
linguistics in originalist research is currently limited with respect to 
the unamended Constitution and the first twelve amendments. The 
Corpus of the Founding Era American English (COFEA) is not yet 
available, and the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) 
begins with 1810. When COFEA becomes available, there will be 
 
 46.  For a description of data collection and data selection in contemporary 
lexicography, see SVENSÉN, supra note 15, at 39–75. For a discussion of a corpus-
based approach to lexicography, see VINCENT B. Y. OOI, COMPUTER CORPUS LEXICO-
GRAPHY  (1998). 
 47.  Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a 
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915. 
 48.  State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 40, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Lee, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); see also Recent Case, State v. Rasabout, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1468 (2016). 
 49.  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016) (“Keeping in mind that 
we must interpret the word ‘information’ as used in the DLEOA ‘according to the common 
and approved usage of the language,’ we apply a tool that can aid in the discovery of ‘how 
particular words or phrases are actually used in written or spoken English.’ The Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA) allows users to ‘analyze[] ordinary meaning 
through a method that is quantifiable and verifiable.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 50.  See, e.g., D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the 
Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517; Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule 
of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2016); James C 
Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: 
A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016); Lawrence M. 
Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 57 (2016); 
Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus 
Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017). 
 51.  Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2018). 
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corpora with coverage corresponding to the relevant historical period 
for all the provisions of the United States Constitution.52 
B. Corpus Lexicography and Conventional Semantic Meaning 
The primary use of corpus linguistics in the investigation of 
original public meaning is likely to be in connection with the 
identification of the relevant senses or meanings of the words and 
phrases that appear in the constitutional text. It seems likely that 
many of the words and phrases had meanings at the time of drafting 
that correspond to their contemporary meanings (their conventional 
semantic meanings in twenty-first century American English). Thus, 
it seems extremely unlikely that numerical words, as in two senators, 
have undergone significant linguistic drift. In other cases, the 
relevant sense of the word may not be available to contemporary 
linguistic intuitions because of linguistic drift or semantic shift. For 
these cases, the application of corpus techniques may reveal the 
relevant meaning. 
For example, a corpus lexicography approach to the meaning of 
the word science in late eighteenth century American English would 
begin by identifying relevant corpora. The best corpus for this 
purpose will be COFEA, which is currently under development at 
Brigham Young University Law School.53 When COFEA becomes 
available, a collocates search using the phrase science of could be 
conducted. Results of the search could then be coded (using blind 
coding) as consistent or inconsistent with various candidate 
meanings. The outcome of this process would be a set of candidate 
meanings—different senses of the word science that might have been 
employed in the Intellectual Property Clause of Article I, Section 8. 
For illustrative purposes, we can conduct the search in COHA 
(which targets a later historical period). The most common 
collocates, include the following, ranked one through twenty in 
terms of frequency: 
 
 52.  See Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference, BYU L., http://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (“BYU Law School is currently developing the Corpus of Founding 
Era American English (COFEA).”). 
 53.  Id. 
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Table 1: Collocates for science of 
 
Rank Collocate of science of Frequency 
1 Government 142 
2 Economy 105 
3 Many 71 
4 Life 65 
5 Language 65 
6 War 62 
7 Language 61 
8 Life 59 
9 Politics 57 
10 Art 54 
11 Law 54 
12 Chemistry 53 
13 History 43 
14 Education 42 
15 Astronomy 41 
16 Religion 40 
17 Society 37 
18 Psychology 36 
19 Theology 34 
20 Physics 33 
 
Although this “toy” application of corpus lexicography is very crude, 
it illustrates the kind of information that can be revealed by corpus 
techniques. There is a modern sense of science that is associated with 
the STEM disciplines; a modern reader might assume that science 
means the hard sciences and excludes the social sciences, humanities, 
and even the other components of STEM (technology, engineering, 
and mathematics). But this reading would be incorrect; the frequent 
use of science of in proximity with words like government, politics, 
art, law, religion, and theology suggests that the word science may 
have had a broader meaning, perhaps corresponding to 
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“[k]nowledge or understanding acquired by study; acquaintance 
with or mastery of any branch of learning”—one of the definitions 
offered by the Oxford English Dictionary.54 
C. Collocates and Contextual Disambiguation 
Although corpus lexicography can help to identify the 
conventional semantic meanings that were available to the authors 
and readers of a constitutional provision, corpus data alone cannot 
disambiguate the text. Corpus data may tell us something about the 
relative frequency of the various meanings, but the most frequent 
meaning is not necessarily the ordinary meaning in context.55 For 
example, the most frequent use of the word impeachment may be 
“the action of calling into question the integrity or validity of 
something” as in “impeachment of a witness,” but in the context of 
Article I, Sections 2 and 3 and Article II, Sections 2 and 4, 
impeachment is used in the sense that refers to “a charge of 
misconduct made against the holder of a public office.”  
Contextual disambiguation is usually accomplished by reading 
the relevant provision and determining which meaning of an 
ambiguous word or phrase gives the provision a coherent meaning. 
It would make little sense for the House of Representatives to have 
the power to impeach witnesses, but it makes perfect sense for the 
 
 54.  Science, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172672? 
redirectedFrom=science#eid (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (providing, as one definition of science, 
“The kind of organized knowledge or intellectual activity of which the various branches of 
learning are examples”). 
 55.  Professor Clarissa Hessick writes, “Corpus linguists advocate treating the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ inquiry in statutory interpretation as an empirical question: the ordinary meaning 
should be ascertained by consulting a linguistics database to determine how frequently a term 
is used in a certain manner.” Clarissa Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 
BYU L. REV. 1503, 1504. To the extent that Professor Hessick is making a claim about all (or 
almost all) advocates of corpus linguistics, this claim is in error and unsubstantiated. Frequency 
data may be evidence of the ordinary meaning of a term in context, but this evidence must be 
combined with contextual disambiguation, including the context provided by the text itself 
(e.g., the whole statute or whole constitution) and the relevant context of communication 
(e.g., the publicly available context of constitutional communication). Another corpus 
technique—the identification of collocates—may assist the process of contextual 
disambiguation, as is illustrated in Table 1 above. Hessick does not discuss the role that an 
analysis of collocates might play in contextual disambiguation, nor does she consider the role 
that corpus linguistics should play in a more comprehensive methodology of statutory 
interpretation—analogous to the method of incorporation proposed in this Article. 
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House to levy a charge of misconduct against “[t]he President, Vice-
President, and all civil officers of the United States”56 and for those 
officials to be tried by the Senate and then removed from office if 
convicted. Corpus lexicography can identify the set of candidate 
meanings and the surrounding and connecting provisions 
then  disambiguate. 
Nonetheless, corpus techniques may also be useful in the process 
of contextual disambiguation. Corpus techniques allow searches for 
words used in proximity with each other. Thus, the word commerce 
in Article I, Section 8 appears near the word regulate. COFEA could 
be searched for occurrences of these words or related forms of their 
root words in proximity, and such searches might be relevant to the 
question whether the word commerce was used in a sense referring to 
“trade in goods” or whether it instead was used to mean something 
like “social interaction.”57 
D. Corpus Linguistics and Contextual Enrichment 
Corpus techniques play an even more attenuated role in the 
discovery of contextual enrichments. Contextual enrichments are 
context specific, whereas corpus techniques reveal data about the use 
of words in phrases outside the particular context of use. This is not 
to say that corpus lexicography plays no role in the identification of 
contextual enrichments. In order to understand the context that 
gives rise to an enrichment, the interpreter must understand 
the words and phrases that constitute the context. In this 
sense, contextual enrichments are almost always parasitic on 
semantic  meanings.58 
The existence of modulations provides an important limitation 
on the use of corpus lexicography. Modulations can be created on 
 
 56.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 57.  Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that 
“commerce” means “intercourse”) with Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of 
“Commerce”, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623 (criticizing Balkin’s view and arguing that “commerce” 
meant the trade or transportation of things or persons). 
 58.  I say “almost always” because it is at least possible that a contextual enrichment 
could result from nonverbal cues that do not depend on semantic meaning. This possibility 
may be limited to oral communication or the unusual case of face-to-face written 
communication (e.g., the use of signs or cue-cards). I am bracketing questions involving 
sign  language. 
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the fly—the meaning of a word can be modified through usage. 
Thus, the word recess in the Recess Appointments Clause may have 
been a modulation created by the juxtaposition of the recess of the 
Senate with the session of the Senate. This modulation may have 
come into being when the Recess Appointments Clause was drafted. 
This sense of recess would not be revealed by corpus techniques 
focused on usage prior to the Constitution, because the modulation 
did not preexist the Constitution itself. Post-Constitution usage 
might reveal the modulation, but only if the corpora included the 
modulated term. 
V. THE ORIGINALIST METHOD OF IMMERSION 
Corpus linguistics is data-driven. It involves large datasets, 
coding, and quantification. The method of immersion is quite 
different; it requires the investigators to immerse themselves in the 
texts from the relevant period in order to “train up” their linguistic 
intuitions. The method of immersion is related to methods utilized 
by historians and political scientists, particularly methods associated 
with the intellectual history tradition in history departments and the 
American political development tradition in political science, but, as 
we shall see, it is different in significant respects. 
A. What is “Immersion”? 
For the purposes of this Article, let us stipulate the following 
description of the method of immersion: 
The originalist method of immersion in the language of the period 
consists in the researcher reading a wide variety of sources from the 
relevant period. To count as immersive, the reading must draw on 
sources that are representative of language use of the relevant 
period. Such sources are not limited to writings directly relevant to 
the Constitution, but should include sources such as diaries, 
newspapers, broadsheets, novels, and letters. Immersion requires a 
substantial period, months and years, not days and weeks. 
This description should be viewed as tentative—a proposal for 
discussion at a preliminary stage rather than a well-developed and 
tested standard for scholarly practice. 
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B. Is Immersion Required to Recover Communicative Content? 
Native speakers of a natural language possess linguistic 
competence. This means that in ordinary cases they will be able 
glean the communicative content of well-formed expressions in that 
language. Thus, because I am a native speaker of American English 
of the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first 
century, I am usually able to understand written and spoken English 
produced during my lifetime—although I might have difficulty with 
some dialects and the specialized vocabulary of some linguistic 
subcommunities. The linguistic competence of non-native speakers is 
different: I have had some formal training in German, Italian, and 
Spanish. Although I am not fluent in any of those languages, I can 
understand simple sentences, and I can usually translate German into 
English with the aid of a dictionary.  Some non-native speakers may 
achieve linguistic competence in a second language that is 
substantially equivalent to that acquired by native speakers.  There 
are no native speakers of eighteenth century or nineteenth century 
American English today, but it is at least possible that the method of 
immersion could produce linguistic competence that approximates 
the linguistic competences of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
native speakers of American English. 
Public meaning originalism requires the reconstruction of 
the communicative content of the constitutional text. Such 
reconstruction requires interpreters to be able to access the semantics 
and pragmatics available to a competent speaker of American English 
at the time each provision was framed and ratified. 
Consider semantics first! Because twenty-first century American 
English is closely related to the American English of the late 
eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, and the early twentieth 
century, acquiring competence for those periods is not as difficult as 
acquiring linguistic competence in a foreign language or in the 
English of a much earlier period. Although there are variations in 
semantics (due to linguistic drift) the semantics of the relevant 
periods are not difficult to acquire. For example, American law 
students read eighteenth-century texts, including the Constitution, 
The Federalist Papers, and excerpts from the Philadelphia Convention 
as well as many early nineteenth-century opinions. Reading such 
texts may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Even constitutional 
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scholars may fail to notice that a word or phrase had a different 
meaning in the relevant period, but such mistakes are likely to be 
rare. For example, contemporary readers of the constitution are 
unlikely to read domestic violence in Article IV as referring to spousal 
abuse, child abuse, or elder abuse; the surrounding context is 
sufficient to avoid the error. 
Not every case of linguistic drift is easily detectible. Modern 
readers may be unaware of the fact that the primary use of dollar in 
the eighteenth century referred to a Spanish coin.59 It is even 
possible for a modern reader to make the egregious mistake of 
assuming that dollar referred to modern Federal Reserve Notes. But 
even in this case, immersion in the primary materials is not required 
to detect the linguistic drift. The Oxford English Dictionary provides 
the following definition of dollar: 
2. The English name for the peso or piece of eight (i.e. eight 
reales), formerly current in Spain and the Spanish American 
colonies, and largely used in the British N. American Colonies at 
the time of their revolt.60 
The definition itself mentions the use of the Spanish dollar during 
the relevant historical period, and the first instance of usage for the 
definition that refers to U.S. currency dates from 1782.61 Thus, even 
casual research is sufficient to raise the possibility of linguistic drift. 
So far as I am aware, no one has produced an example of 
linguistic drift that could only be detected by someone who has 
immersed themselves in eighteenth century sources—although it is 
possible that such examples exist. Because the language of the 
constitutional text has been in continuous use and thereby influences 
contemporary usage and because there has been substantial 
continuity in the evolution of American English, most contemporary 
readers who acquire some background knowledge are likely to 
believe that they understand the constitutional text. There may be 
some exceptions. Some constitutional provisions—perhaps the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Privileges or Immunities 
 
 59. Dollar, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/56602? 
redirectedFrom=dollar#eid (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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Clause—may seem obscure to contemporary readers. I have an 
intuitive sense of the meaning of the individual words in these 
clauses, but their precise communicative content is difficult to parse. 
When confronted with these clauses, my instinct is that extensive 
consultation of the constitutional record may be necessary to glean 
their original meaning.62 
If it is unlikely that immersion is required to access the semantic 
content of most of the constitutional text, what about contextual 
disambiguation and enrichment? Immersion might be required to 
recreate the context that enables disambiguation of words or phrases 
with multiple meaning. Likewise, immersion might enable recreation 
of the context necessary for contextual enrichments such as 
implicatures, implicitures, and presuppositions. The extent to which 
immersion is necessary depends on particular enrichments. Some 
enrichments are obvious with general knowledge of the context, 
whereas others may be subtle and require the deep knowledge 
produced by immersion. Because it requires actual immersion and a 
search for original communicative content to recognize enrichments 
that require deep knowledge, it may well be the case that we do not 
yet know what enrichments would emerge from immersive study of 
the text. 
C. Distinguishing Immersion from the Methods of Intellectual History 
The method of immersion, as I have described it, bears 
important affinities to methods employed by historians and 
particularly to the methods employed in the subfield of intellectual 
history. Intellectual historians immerse themselves in the texts of the 
period, actor, or set of ideas that they study. There are, however, 
substantial differences between the two approaches. A full account of 
the relationship between history and originalism is far beyond the 
scope of this Article. Nonetheless, some of the differences can 
be  sketched: 
• The originalist method of immersion aims to recover the 
communicative content of the constitutional text. Historical 
 
 62. On the difficulties with interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clauses, see John 
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014). 
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immersion typically has different aims, including the 
construction of narratives that illuminate causal connections 
and the discovery of the motives and aim of historical actors. 
• The originalist method of immersion draws on sources that 
are relevant given the theory of original meaning. For public 
meaning originalism, immersion aims to recreate the 
linguistic competence of members of the public who 
were members of the intended readership of the 
constitutional  text.63 
• The originalist method of immersion assumes that the 
constitutional text provides a coherent plan of government 
that should constrain constitutional practice—a claim that 
originalists redeem by making arguments for the Constraint 
Principle (or a similar idea). Historians may not share this 
aim, and may instead believe that the Constitution is 
incoherent, unworkable, illegitimate, or evil.64 Given these 
background beliefs, some historians have no interest in 
recovering the communicative content of the constitutional 
text—an enterprise they may regard as pernicious or foolish. 
Given the differences in aim, sources, and assumptions, the 
originalist method of immersion and the kinds of immersion 
practiced by historians are likely to diverge in practice. 
Work by the eminent constitutional historian Jack Rakove reflects 
immersion in the framing period,65 but Rakove’s Original Meanings 
does not focus on the communicative content of the text—indeed, 
the text is rarely quoted and never (or almost never) parsed for its 
 
 63.  Other versions of originalism would have different versions of immersion. For 
example, original methods originalism would aim to recover the legal competence of 
practitioners of the original methods of constitutional interpretation and construction. 
Intentionalists would aim to recover the communicative intentions of the authors of particular 
constitutional provision. Similar points could be made about other forms of originalism. 
 64.  See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Constitution Doesn’t Mean What You Think It Means, 
BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2017/04/01/the-
constitution-doesn-mean-what-you-think-means/2fvpqWCBD7BP1CPLCBHlZP/story.html. 
For some questions about Bilder’s claims, see Lawrence B. Solum, Professor Bilder, Please 
Answer These Questions!, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2017), http://lsolum.typepad. 
com/legaltheory/2017/04/professor-bilder-please-answer-these-questions.html. 
 65.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1st Vintage Books Ed. 2010). 
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communicative content. Like most intellectual historians, Rakove’s 
primary concern is with motivations, ideology, and ideas, and not 
with the semantics or pragmatics of the Constitution. Another recent 
example of the divergence is provided by Michael Klarman’s The 
Framers’ Coup,66 a history of the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution that is almost wholly unconcerned with the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text.67 Klarman’s neo-Beardisan 
account of the making of the Constitution is aimed at establishing 
the antidemocratic nature of the Constitution and the self-interested 
motives of the framers, but Klarman does not aim to recover the 
communicative content of any of the specific clauses that make up 
the constitutional text. The aim of immersion as practiced by 
Rakove, Klarman, and others is not the recovery of original meaning. 
This suggests that originalist immersion, despite its similarity to 
immersion as practiced by historians, will differ in significant 
respects. Many intellectual historians do not aim at the recovery of 
the linguistic competences of the public as their primary goal. 
This point about the aims of historians should be qualified. Some 
historians are very interested in the original meaning of the 
constitutional text—even if they are also interested in purposes, 
motives, and political context.68 
VI. THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECORD 
The method of studying the constitutional record is the most 
familiar and widely practiced approach to originalist research. The 
first step in the explication of this method is identification of its 
component parts. 
 
 66.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION (2016). 
 67.  The phrase public meaning does not appear in The Framers’ Coup, nor do related 
phrases like original meaning (except in citations), communicative content, linguistic meaning, 
or semantic meaning (and the word semantic in any usage). Indeed, the word meaning is 
almost always used in one of its senses that is not connected to linguistic meaning. The search 
was conducted on the Kindle version of The Framer’s Coup. 
 68.  This claim is not susceptible of documentation. My impression is that this group of 
historians includes Dean William Treanor at Georgetown University Law Center and G. 
Edward White at the University of Virginia School of Law. It seems likely that there are 
many  others. 
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A. Five Components: Precursor Provisions, Drafting History, 
Ratification Debates, Early Historical Practice, and Early 
Judicial Decisions 
There are at least five components of the method of studying the 
constitutional record: (1) precursor provisions and proposals, (2) the 
drafting history, (3) the ratification debates, (4) the early historical 
practice, and (5) early judicial decisions. From the perspective of 
public meaning originalism, the point of studying the record of 
framing, ratification, and implementation is that it may shed light on 
the communicative content of the constitutional text.69 This list is 
not intended to be exclusive, but these five components are among 
the most important elements of the constitutional record. Brief 
comments on each component provide a sketch of the way the 
method operates. 
1. Precursor provisions and proposals 
The first component is examination of precursor provisions and 
proposals. For example, the Articles of Confederation and various 
state constitutions provide precursors of the U.S. Constitution. 
Similarly, there are various precursors of the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution—now called “the Bill of Rights.” The 
examination of precursor provisions provides insight into the 
language of constitutional provisions. Where the language is similar 
or identical, discussion of the meaning of the precursor provision 
may provide insight into the language of the constitutional text. 
Where the language is different, the differences may illuminate the 
meaning—especially if the drafting history focuses on the difference. 
2. The drafting history 
The second component is the drafting history. In the case of the 
unamended text, the drafting history is provided by the records of 
the Philadelphia Convention—although the official record is sparse 
and recent scholarship claims (with substantial support) that 
 
 69.  Other forms of originalism will be interested in the record for other reasons. For 
example, intentionalists will be especially interested in the legislative history for the light it 
sheds on the communicative intentions of the drafters. 
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Madison made substantial revisions of his more complete record of 
the deliberations at the Convention.70 The various amendments were 
drafted by Congress pursuant to its Article V power to propose 
amendments for ratification by the states.71 
From the perspective of public meaning originalism, it is 
important to understand the limited role of the drafting history. This 
topic was explored by Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen in 
their important article, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History.72 The drafting history, like any other text 
from the period, can shed light on the conventional semantic 
meanings of the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional 
text. In other words, the drafting history can provide evidence of 
conventional semantic meaning, but this role is evidential. The 
drafting history may be a valuable source because it provides 
instances of usage of the words that are likely to reflect the senses in 
which the words would have been understood by the public. 
Likewise, the drafting history may provide evidence that confirms or 
disconfirms the hypothesis that a particular provision gives rise to a 
contextual enrichment. 
But this role is only evidential. For a variety of reasons, it is at 
least possible that the public meaning of the text will diverge from 
the meaning supported by the evidence provided by the drafting 
history. For example, it is at least possible that obscure language 
would acquire a more definite meaning during the drafting process 
because of “echo chamber effects.”73 The provision is explicated and 
the explication is accepted and repeated. Through this process, 
language that is unclear could come to seem clear to the participants 
in the drafting process even though the public would simply not 
understand the language or would have an understanding that 
diverged from that of the drafters. Another possibility is that the 
 
 70.  MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015). 
 71.  See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 72.  Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113 (2003). 
 73.  The notion of an echo-chamber effect is usually invoked in nonlinguistic contexts. 
See, e.g., Nicholas DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011, 3:56 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/22/barack-obama-and-the-psychology 
-of-the-birther-myth/the-echo-chamber-effect. 
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language was drafted to convey one impression to the public, but a 
different meaning was to be conveyed to insiders (for example, 
members of the Supreme Court).74 Secret drafting processes or the 
manipulation of the drafting record could create space for this kind 
of deception. 
3. The ratification debates 
The third component is the record of ratification. In the case of 
the unamended Constitution, the ratification debates are the records 
of the ratifying conventions held in the several states and the public 
debates in various sources, including prominently The Federalist 
Papers and the writings of various Antifederalists. In the case of the 
amendments, ratification occurs in the state legislatures. Depending 
on the amendment, such records may or may not be easily available; 
in some cases, they may be nonexistent. 
Debates over ratification of a constitutional provision have 
significant advantages over the drafting history as evidence of public 
meaning. Many ratifiers of the unamended Constitution were not 
participants in the drafting process; the perspective of these ratifiers 
is similar to that of the public. The ratification debates for the 
unamended Constitution were conducted in a variety of forums: in 
the ratifying conventions, newspapers, pamphlets, and broadsheets. 
Both supporters and opponents of the constitution participated in 
the debates. Amendments are debated in state legislatures, and their 
deliberations are accompanied by public political debate—although 
such debate rarely approaches the extensive and intensive 
discussions that characterized the Philadelphia Convention and The 
Federalist  Papers. 
 
 74.  For a discussion of the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to 
create deliberate ambiguity, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM 
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51–53 (1988) (discussing ambiguity 
introduced by final version of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment and stating “[a] 
second explanation [for the ambiguity] is the committee . . . substituted a phrasing that was 
sufficiently broad so that those who favored federal protection of political rights could 
construe it to provide such protection, and sufficiently innocuous so that those who opposed 
giving such power to the federal government could be reassured that the amendment did no 
such thing”). 
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There are, however, limits on the evidentiary value of the 
ratification debates. Adversarial discourse is unlikely to result in 
dispassionate and neutral assessment of the communicative content 
of the text. Opponents of ratification are likely to interpret the text 
in ways that support arguments that adoption would produce 
consequences that would be viewed as undesirable. Proponents of 
the text will do the opposite. This phenomenon is familiar from 
debates about the extent of the legislative power granted by the text 
produced by the Philadelphia Convention. Antifederalists argued 
that the broad goals outlined in the Preamble and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would produce virtually unlimited federal power75; 
Federalists countered that Article I conferred only those legislative 
powers “herein granted,” that the enumeration of powers in Section 
8 was limited, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause would not 
confer unlimited power.76 After ratification, a remarkable 
transformation took place. High Federalists argued that 
federal power was virtually unlimited, and Antifederalists opposed 
this  reading.77 
4. Early historical practice 
The early history of implementation also provides evidence 
bearing on the communicative content of the constitutional text. If 
those who implemented the text intended to act in ways that are 
consistent with the text, what they did is evidence of what they 
understood the text to mean. This evidence disfavors hypotheses that 
are inconsistent with the early implementation history and favors 
those that are consistent. Moreover, the meaning of the text may 
have been debated in connection with early historical practice; those 
debates may shed light on the meaning of the text.  
Once again, there are limitations on the value of this category of 
evidence. There is no guarantee that the officials (e.g., presidents 
and members of Congress) did in fact make good faith efforts to 
 
 75.  See Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1059–60. 
 76.  See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1507 (2001). 
 77.  For history of the debates after ratification, see JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 71–92 (1999). 
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remain in compliance with the Constitution. In some cases, they may 
simply have neglected to consider the constitutional questions; in 
other cases, they may have deliberately decided to violate the 
Constitution. Even if they acted in good faith, they may have 
engaged in motivated reasoning, convincing themselves that their 
action was consistent with public meaning of the text when in fact it 
was not. 
One way to sort out the evidentiary value of early historical 
practice is to distinguish three categories: (1) disputed practice, (2) 
undisputed practice, and (3) inaction. 
a. Disputed historical practice. The most prominent example of 
the role of early historical practice in constitutional interpretation 
and construction is the controversy over the First Bank of the United 
States. The constitutionality of the Bank was the subject of a serious 
dispute, famously including opinions from various members of 
President Washington’s cabinet, including Hamilton, Madison, and 
Randolph.78 The fact of dispute itself is relevant to the assessment of 
the meaning of the Sweepings Clause—and one lesson of the dispute 
might be that the clause’s public meaning was ambiguous. The 
concept of “liquidation” is associated with the Bank dispute and its 
subsequent treatment by Madison in connection with his decision to 
sign the bill establishing the Second Bank of the United States—
despite his earlier doubts about the constitutionality of the First 
Bank.79 One reading of Madison’s theory of liquidation is that it was 
a method of construction for the resolution of ambiguity and 
therefore not a method for discovery of the public meaning of 
the  text. 
One difficulty with early but disputed practice is that the 
statements of the disputants may not provide accurate 
representations of the communicative content of the constitutional 
 
 78.  Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Congressional Power, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7–45 
(2016); Michael Coblenz, The Fight Goes on Forever: “Limited Government” and the First Bank 
of the United States, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 391, 409–38 (2015). 
 79.  The basic idea of liquidation is that historical practice may resolve a dispute about 
the meaning of the text by “liquidating” the ambiguity. For a discussion of “liquidation,” see 
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation (Aug. 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author); Paul G. Ream, Note, Liquidation of Constitutional Meaning Through Use, 66 
DUKE L.J. 1645 (2017). 
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text. They may engage in motivated reasoning or have incentives to 
“twist words” to achieve a political objective. Disputes over the 
constitutionality of early practice provide evidence of meaning, but 
that evidence needs to be carefully assessed. 
b. Undisputed historical practice. Another kind of early historical 
practice occurs when constitutionally salient action is taken without 
discussion or debate of the constitutional issues. Thus, legislation 
enacted by the First Congress provides some evidence that the 
enacted measures were thought to be within the legislative power of 
Congress, and this evidence would count against any theory of the 
meaning of Article I that is inconsistent with such evidence. 
Undisputed historical practice suffers from a different problem 
than does the disputed variety. If the constitutional issues are never 
discussed, it is possible that the early practice was unconstitutional 
but uncontroversial. Once again, undisputed historical practice 
provides evidence relevant to communicative content, but careful 
assessment of the evidence is required. 
c. Inaction. The final category is not historical practice in the 
conventional sense of a constitutionally salient action; rather this 
category consists of “dogs that did not bark”—actions that were not 
taken during the historical period shortly following the adoption of a 
constitutional provision. That Congress failed to enact a particular 
piece of legislation is consistent both with the hypothesis that it 
lacked power to do so and with the hypothesis that it did have such 
power. This evidence, however is highly dependent on context. 
Most inaction provides very weak evidence of original meaning 
because inaction can result from so many reasons and causes. 
Members of Congress may never have considered the possibility of 
passing the law in question. Or they may have considered the 
possibility and concluded that the legislation was undesirable. Or 
they may have considered the legislation, concluded that it was 
desirable, but then realized that the proposed legislation was 
unconstitutional. If inaction is accompanied by a record of 
deliberation about a constitutional issue, that record may provide 
evidence of original meaning—although the usual caveats about the 
possibility of motivated reasoning apply. 
10.SOLUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:12 PM 
1621 Triangulating Public Meaning 
 1661 
One example of the use of inaction as evidence of constitutional 
meaning is contained in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in National 
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius.80 Roberts reasoned 
that the failure of Congress to use the power to mandate some 
action by individuals not currently engaged in interstate commerce 
had never been exercised by Congress in the past and that this 
provided evidence that Congress lacked such a power.81 
5. Early judicial decisions 
Another aspect of the record that may bear on public meaning of 
the constitutional text is early judicial decisions interpreting the 
Constitution. The case for the evidentiary value of the early decisions 
is similar to that of early historical practice by the political branches. 
The early judicial decisions are close in time to drafting of the text. If 
judges aim in good faith to determine the public meaning of the 
text, their understanding would be strong evidence of that meaning. 
If an early decision provides a discussion of the linguistic meaning of 
the provision,that would be especially valuable evidence of the 
original public meaning, but applications would also have evidentiary 
value. Interpretations that are consistent with early decisions would 
be favored by those decisions, whereas interpretations that are 
inconsistent with the early decisions would be disfavored. 
As with early historical practice, there may be reasons to discount 
early judicial decisions. The assumption that the judges in early cases 
are attempting to discern public meaning in good faith may be false. 
Early judges may have had political or ideological agendas. For 
example, some may believe that John Marshall’s early constitutional 
decisions served a pro-nationalist or High Federalist political 
agenda—expanding the power of the national government beyond 
that authorized by the original public meaning of the constitutional 
 
 80.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 81. Id. at 549–51 (“[S]ometimes the most telling indication of a severe constitutional 
problem is the lack of historical precedent for Congress’s action.” (internal citations and 
punctuation omitted)); see also Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 
(2017) (critiquing the argument that a novel exercise of power is evidence of that 
power’s  unconstitutionality). 
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text.82 Others may believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases substantially departed from the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—perhaps because of judicial hostility.83 
Even if early judges acted in subjective good faith, their political 
or ideological views might have had a subconscious biasing effect on 
their decisions. For example, if language is ambiguous, there may be 
a natural tendency to prefer the normatively more attractive 
interpretation—and in the early period, judges relied almost 
exclusively on their own linguistic intuitions without a significant 
external check.  
Multimember courts may provide a check on the linguistic 
intuitions of individual judges: the biased or mistaken intuitions of 
one judge might be counteracted by the more accurate intuitions of 
another. But even in this case, it is possible that all judges on the 
court share the same bias—for example, during the period following 
the election of 1800 when Federalist judges dominated the judiciary 
but Democratic-Republicans controlled Congress and the 
Presidency. And multi-member courts may be subject to echo-
chamber effects, whereby an initial interpretation comes to dominate 
the interpretation of the group through repetition such that an 
actual ambiguity becomes invisible to those in the echo chamber. 
Another issue is raised by the fact that very few of the earliest 
constitutional provisions (through the first ten amendments) 
produced judicial decisions. Many of the decisions that are now 
recognized as important were rendered many years after the 
Philadelphia Convention or the First Congress. For example, 
 
 82.  FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 132–34 
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1981) (noting criticisms of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch); Mark R. 
Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some Thoughts on the 
Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 916 (2003) (“Many of the most 
significant political conflicts during the post-ratification years were precipitated by the Court, 
in particular by decisions of John Marshall and his brethren that the Jeffersonian Republicans 
abhorred as expressions of a reactionary High Federalist approach to the interrelated questions 
of federal power and federal-state relations.”). 
 83.  Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 627, 627 (1994) 
(“‘[E]veryone’ agrees the [Supreme] Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.”). 
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McCulloch v. Maryland was decided in 1819—some thirty-two years 
after the drafting of the Article I.84 Gibbons v. Ogden was decided in 
1824—thirty-seven years after the drafting of the Commerce 
Clause.85 Whatever evidentiary value should be afforded these 
cases, they do not represent immediate implementation of 
the  Constitution. 
B. Caveats 
The method of studying the record is subject to several caveats, 
some of which have been mentioned implicitly in the discussion of 
the five components. 
1. Distinguishing communicative content and legal content 
When engaging in the method of studying the record, it is 
important to bear in mind the distinction between communicative 
content and legal content.86 During the founding era (as today), 
interpretation and construction can become blurred. The 
communicative content of the constitutional text may not clearly be 
distinguished from the legal content of implementing doctrines. This 
issue is particularly important with respect to the record of 
implementation by the political branches and early judicial decisions. 
Courts articulate legal doctrines, and they may move from discussion 
of the linguistic meaning to legal meaning seamlessly, without clearly 
identifying the transition from the interpretation of the text to the 
construction of implementing rules. 
For this reason, it is important to distinguish between the use of 
the record of framing, ratification, and implementation as evidence 
of communicative content of the constitutional text from the use of 
the record as evidence of the legal content of constitutional doctrine 
during the period that is proximate in time to the framing and 
ratification. Public originalism uses the record as evidence of the 
former but rejects the use of the same evidence for the purpose of 
 
 84. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 86.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479 (2013) (discussing the distinction between communicative content and 
legal content). 
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establishing the legal content of early constitutional doctrine that is 
supposed to be binding on the present. Original legal content can 
provide evidence of public meaning, but legal content does not itself 
constitute binding original meaning.87 
2. The proper role of original application expectations 
The distinction between communicative content and legal 
content is closely related to a caution about the relationship of 
original expected applications to original public meaning. 
Applications are, by definition, on the construction side of the 
interpretation-construction distinction. Expectations about 
applications are beliefs about how a provision will be applied to a 
particular case or issue. Original expected applications are the 
expectations about applications that were held at the time a 
constitutional provision was framed and ratified. Expectations are 
mental states and, for that reason, different actors can have different 
expectations regarding the application of the same constitutional 
provision. Thus, there could be applications by the individual 
drafters, by the convention or Congress that proposed a 
constitutional provision, by the members of the ratifying convention 
or state legislature, or by the public. 
Crucially, application expectations, even by the author of a text, 
are fundamentally different from the communicative content of the 
text. The correct application of a text to a legal issue or particular 
case involves the application of law to fact. Suppose that an 
expectation about application is based on a true belief about the 
public meaning of the constitutional text. An application expectation 
could nonetheless be a misleading guide to recovering the 
communicative content of the text if that expectation was based 
on a  false belief about the facts. Consider the following 
hypothetical  example:88 
 
 87.  Note that original law originalism may regard the original legal content as binding 
today—unless it has been validly changed. 
 88.  The hypothetical examples draw on text in Mary Frances Rooney’s work on this 
issue. See M. Frances Rooney, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and an Originalist Defense of Gender Nondiscrimination, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 737 (2017). 
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Suppose that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a set of basic rights (privileges and 
immunities) that include the right to pursue a lawful occupation. 
These rights are extended to all citizens of the United States. 
Suppose further that these rights are subject to reasonable 
regulation for the public good, and hence that a state legislature 
can enact a law that limits certain lawful occupations to persons 
who are capable of competently engaging in the occupation. The 
practice of law is a lawful occupation, but nonetheless, a state 
legislature can require that lawyers pass a test (a bar exam) as a 
condition for practicing law. And the legislature might also pass a 
law that limits the practice of law on the basis of age—disqualifying 
children from practicing law on a categorical basis because it is in 
fact the case that almost all children lack the intellectual capacity to 
practice law. Further suppose that the constitutional record reveals 
such an application expectation belief: hypothetically, in debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment, someone might have said that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not be violated by a 
statute that required lawyers to pass a bar exam and be of eighteen 
or more years of age. 
This application belief is consistent with the postulated 
interpretation—that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
a  set of basic rights among which was the right to pursue a 
lawful  application.  
 Now consider a second hypothetical example: 
Suppose the understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
postulated above. Assume in addition that at the time the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, almost everyone had a false 
belief that women have intellectual capacities that are similar to 
those of children and, hence, that women are incapable of 
practicing law. Once again, the question arises whether the 
application of the amendment to a statute—this time, one that 
restricts the practice of law to adult men who have passed the bar 
exam. And once again, the record reveals an application belief that 
this statue would not be invalidated. 
In this second example, one might fallaciously argue that the 
application belief is evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
does not protect the rights of women at all because the term citizen 
was limited to men. The fallacy in this argument is apparent: the 
application belief (restricting the practice of law to men is consistent 
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with the Privileges or Immunities Clause) is explained by a false 
belief about the facts that is perfectly consistent with a belief that 
women are citizens and hence that they do have a right to pursue a 
lawful occupation and therefore to practice law—if they have the 
intellectual capacity to do so. 
These hypotheticals shed light on the relevance of Bradwell v. 
Illinois89 to the interpretation of the Privilege or Immunities Clause. 
The Court rejected Myra Bradwell’s argument that her exclusion 
from the practice of law by the State of Illinois violated the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. The majority opinion in Bradwell was based 
on the Court’s prior decisions in the Slaughterhouse Cases and 
United States v. Cruickshank90—cases in which the majority restricted 
the meaning of “Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United 
States” to an extremely small set so as to virtually nullify the clause. 
Another group of Justices accepted the basic rights interpretation of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and did not question that 
women were citizens. These Justices rejected Bradwell’s claim on the 
basis of a false factual belief—that women lacked the intellectual 
capacity necessary for the practice of law. This kind of factual belief is 
not part of the communicative content of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Hence, the application beliefs revealed by the 
opinions in Bradwell may not provide evidence that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause does not encompass the basic economic rights of 
women, once the process of application is guided by true beliefs 
about the intellectual capacities of women. Thus, the original public 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause might be consistent 
with conclusion the coverture laws are unconstitutional, given true 
beliefs about the capacity of women to manage their own affairs, 
while similar restrictions of the property and contractual rights of 
young children would nonetheless be constitutional because on the 
actual facts, these restrictions are reasonable. 
 
 89.   Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
 90.   United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
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VII. THE METHOD OF TRIANGULATION 
Having discussed the three vertexes of the triangle (corpus 
linguistics, immersion, and the record), we can now discuss the 
Method of Triangulation itself. How can these three methods 
be  combined? 
 
A. Immersion versus Corpus Linguistics 
The method of corpus linguistics aims to recover the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text by systematic analysis of 
corpora—typically large databases that are designed to capture 
representative patterns of usage and can be coded to reveal the range 
and frequency of conventional semantic meanings. The method of 
immersion (as practiced by originalists) aims to recreate the linguistic 
capacities of a competent speaker of American English at the time 
the constitutional provision at issue was framed and ratified. How 
can these methods cross-check each other? 
Consider first the role of corpus linguistics in checking the 
linguistic intuitions generated by the method of immersion. Were 
immersion perfect, it would result in a group of scholars each of 
whom had a set of linguistic intuitions that would closely 
approximate the linguistic intuitions of native speakers of the 
American English of the era. 
Of course, different native speakers will have different sets of 
linguistic intuitions, reflecting different histories of exposure to the 
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speakers are exposed to different ranges of usage. Some speakers 
acquire larger vocabularies than others—acquiring familiarity with a 
greater number of words and phrases. Some speakers become 
acquainted with a wider range of meanings and hence have an ability 
to disambiguate more accurately, whereas others may have been 
exposed to a narrower range of senses of the same words and 
phrases. Some speakers acquire knowledge of specialized vocabulary 
of linguistic subcommunities, for example, the technical terms used 
by lawyers, mariners, or bookkeepers. Other speakers may not be 
members of a linguistic subcommunity with a specialized vocabulary. 
For this reason, a comprehensive recreation of the linguistic world of 
any particular period, for example, the late eighteenth century, 
would require multiple immersions—each of which would duplicate 
representative speakers of the period. In practice, this ideal may 
never be fully realized. 
Can the kind of immersion that could be feasibly practiced by 
modern scholars replicate the linguistic capacities of competent 
speakers from early constitutional periods? Native speakers acquire 
language in a particular way: as children, they interact with other 
native speakers. This process of interaction includes explicit language 
teaching, corrections of errors in usage, observations of success and 
failure when the speaker aims to achieve some aim, listening to 
conversations, and reading texts of many different kinds. The 
interactive component of language acquisition is difficult or 
impossible to replicate. For example, historians who practice the 
method of immersion typically immerse themselves in texts relevant 
to their research project, but they cannot interact with native 
speakers of eighteenth-century or mid-nineteenth-century English. 
Unless, of course, they have access to a time machine.  
Another problem with the replication of linguistic competence 
by the method of immersion concerns the representativeness of the 
texts that are selected. Historians and legal scholars who immerse 
themselves in the texts of a particular period may face selection bias 
problems. For example, a constitutional historian might focus on 
texts that are relevant to the historian’s research project. This might 
include many different sources, letters, diaries, broadsheets, works of 
political philosophy, legal texts, and so forth. But such a historian 
might not sample nursery rhymes, childrearing manuals, novels, or 
the diaries of farmers who did not engage in constitutional debates. 
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In other words, text selection may not be adequate to recreate the 
linguistic competences of a wide range of ordinary speakers. 
The method of corpus linguistics may provide a useful cross 
check on these limitations on immersion. First and foremost, well-
designed corpora can address the data limitations inherent in the 
method of immersion. Corpora can be very large—much larger than 
the body of literature that could be assimilated by any single 
immersion scholar. Corpora can be designed to provide 
representative samples of the written linguistic world of a particular 
period. And corpora can also be designed to include texts that 
represent a particular linguistic subculture. 
Second, corpus linguistics allows for rigorous intersubjective 
validation of individual subjective judgments about word meaning. 
One of the dangers of the method of immersion is that immersed 
scholars may essentially say, “Trust me. I immersed myself in the 
texts of the period. I know what this provision of the Constitution 
means.” But how do we know whether the supposedly immersed 
scholar is actually immersed? And even if some scholar was deeply 
immersed, did biases and prejudices (conscious or unconscious) 
distort the scholars understanding of the meaning of the provisions? 
Corpus linguistics evidence provides a basis for checking the 
interpretations offered by immersed scholars. If corpus research 
reveals that the meaning proposed by an immersed scholar was very 
rare or nonexistent in the corpus (or corpora) that are queried, that 
fact would undermine the proposed interpretation. 
Just as corpus linguistics can provide a check on immersion, the 
reverse is the case. Immersion can provide a useful check on the 
results reached via corpus linguistics. Corpus research can reveal the 
range of meanings of a given word or phrase and the relative 
frequencies with which these meanings appear within a given corpus. 
And via the use of collocates, corpus research can provide some 
information relevant to disambiguation. But immersed scholars may 
be in a better position than non-immersed scholars when it comes to 
disambiguation—especially if the ambiguity in question is subtle, 
difficult, or complex. Simple lexical ambiguities may be resolved by 
contextual features that can be recognized by non-immersed 
scholars. But there may be syntactic ambiguities that are more 
difficult to detect. Some forms of ambiguity, such as the ambiguity 
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between de dicto and de re usages, may be especially difficult to 
recognize, and immersion in the context may help in these cases.91 
Corpus techniques are particularly ill-suited to cases in which the 
constitution employs a modulation—creating a new meaning for a 
word that deviates in some significant way from preexisting 
meanings. The Recess Appointments Clause, discussed above, 
provides an example of the possible existence of a constitutional 
modulation. The clause reads as follows: “The president shall have 
power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of 
the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of 
their next session.”92 
One understanding of this clause is that the phrase “recess of the 
Senate” is a modulation, to be understood in juxtaposition with the 
“session” of the Senate, and hence limited to what are now called 
“intersession recesses.” A corpus-based inquiry into the use of the 
word “recess” before the adoption could not have revealed this 
meaning—which, assuming that the modulation theory is correct, 
came into being with the drafting of the constitutional text.  
Moreover, corpus techniques will be most useful in the 
investigation of constitutional semantics and syntax, including 
contextual disambiguation, but corpus evidence will rarely bear 
directly on contextual enrichments such as implicatures, implicitures, 
and presuppositions. Because contextual enrichments depend on 
shared context, immersion in publicly available context of 
constitutional communication may assist the reliable discovery of 
contextual enrichments and hence supplement the semantic 
information yielded by corpus linguistics. 
In sum, the method of corpus linguistics and the method of 
immersion are complementary. Both techniques aim to give 
contemporary readers access to the communicative content of the 
constitutional text, but they do so in different ways. Corpus 
linguistics is especially relevant to the discovery of conventional 
semantic meanings and can aid disambiguation. Immersion provides 
 
 91.  United States v. Whittemore, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011, 1011 n.7 (D. Nev. 
2013), aff’d, 776 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2015); Jill Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008). 
 92.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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an alternative and less systematic route to semantics and is especially 
suited to the recovery of contextual enrichments. 
B. Corpus Linguistics Versus the Constitutional Record 
The relationship between corpus linguistics and the method of 
studying the constitutional record is similar to the relationship 
between corpus linguistics and immersion. Indeed, the method of 
studying the constitutional record is itself a specialized and limited 
form of immersion, utilizing a selected set of historical materials that 
are directly relevant to the constitutional question at issue. 
The most direct and obvious way in which corpus linguistics can 
assist in the study of the constitutional record is that the record itself 
must be deciphered. Just as older provisions of the constitutional 
text (especially through the Twelfth Amendment) are written in the 
American English of more than 200 years ago, so too, the 
constitutional record of those provisions is itself written in that 
language. The conventional sources, including Madison’s notes of 
the Philadelphia Convention, The Federalist Papers, Anti-Federalist 
writings, the ratification debates, and the records of the First 
Congress, all contain words and phrases that may have had different 
senses than the contemporary sense of the language. 
The method of the constitutional record can be especially helpful 
in providing evidence concerning beliefs of constitutional actors 
(framers, ratifiers, debaters, members of Congress, judges) that are 
related to but not identical with their beliefs about the meanings of 
the words and phrases (their semantic beliefs). Of course, the 
constitutional record may sometimes reveal direct evidence of 
semantic beliefs, when, for example, a constitutional actor defines or 
paraphrases a constitutional word or phrase. More frequently, the 
constitutional record will provide evidence of beliefs that provide 
indirect evidence of semantic beliefs, such as beliefs expressing 
expectations concerning the application of the constitutional text to 
specific issues or actual and hypothetical situations. Because 
application beliefs underdetermine communicative content and 
because they can actually be inconsistent with communicative 
content, the method of corpus linguistics provides an important 
corrective to the method of the constitutional record. 
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Similarly, the method of the constitutional record can 
supplement and check the results obtained from corpus linguistics. 
Most obviously, the method of corpus linguistics may not be 
sufficient to resolve semantic ambiguities; contextual disambiguation 
requires knowledge of the public context and the constitutional 
record provides the most directly relevant elements of that context. 
Likewise, corpus linguistics may not yield information sufficient to 
identify modulations, but the constitutional record could be a 
fruitful source of information that confirms or disconfirms the 
hypothesis that a particular word or phrase constitutes a modulation. 
C. The Constitutional Record and Immersion 
Finally, consider the relationship between the method of 
immersion and the method of studying the constitutional record. 
Much of the ground has already between covered, but some aspects 
of this relationship require separate comment. This relationship 
implicates the debate over what is sometimes called “law office 
history” and the “history-common-room law.”93 Some brief 
discussion of that debate is necessary to elucidate the two methods 
and the ways in which they can each supplement and check 
the  other. 
The charge that lawyers practice “law office history” is a 
common one, although the history of this rhetorically charged 
phrase is quite different from what one might imagine. The phrase 
was first applied to work done by historians in connection with 
Brown v. Board of Education94—and the charge was that the 
historians had engaged in advocacy-driven history in order to 
support a result that conformed to their political and ideological 
 
 93.  Nicholas J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the 
Incoherence of Justice Steven’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012); Gary 
Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits 
of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (2012); Saikrishna Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law 
Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT 529, 538 (1998). The phrase “history-common-
room law” appears in Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1163 (2015). 
 94.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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preferences. Subsequently, the criticism has been extended to the use 
of history by lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.95 
A full telling of the law-office history debate is outside the scope 
of this Article, but two of the criticisms of law-office history are 
particularly relevant to the Method of Triangulation. The first 
criticism is that judges, lawyers, and legal scholars “cherry pick” the 
historical materials, taking individual sentences and paragraphs out of 
context and ignoring contrary evidence. The second criticism is that 
studying the historical record in isolation is insufficient for deep 
understanding because the meaning of the constitutional record 
itself can be understood only by scholars who have immersed 
themselves in the “thought world” or intellectual and political 
context in which the constitutional record is situated. 
Although the charge that historians practice “history common 
room law” is made less frequently than the “law office history” 
charge, it bears significant resemblance to its counterpart. Here, we 
need to distinguish between two kinds of historians. Many legal and 
constitutional historians are trained in both law and history, 
possessing both a Juris Doctor and a Doctor of Philosophy in history or 
political science. Other historians lack legal training. When historians 
without legal training engage in scholarship about constitutional 
history, several difficulties may arise. First, historians who lack a 
grounding in contemporary constitutional theory and doctrine may 
be criticized on the ground that they do not comprehend the legal 
significance of the historical materials they study. Second, the lack of 
legal training could result in a lack of capacity to understanding the 
contemporary legal implications of even those aspects of history that 
they do, in fact, understand correctly. Some historians may also lack a 
grounding in the philosophy of language and the discipline of 
historical linguistics. Although these deficiencies may not be 
 
 95.  The literature on “law office history” includes Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: 
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119 (locus classicus); Howard Jay Graham, The 
Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1953); David T. Hardy, 
Lawyers, Historians, and “Law-Office History,” 46 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2015); Rebecca 
Piller, History in the Making: Why Courts Are Ill-Equipped to Employ Originalism, 34 REV. 
LITIG. 187 (2015); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993); 
Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13 
J.L. & POL. 809 (1997). 
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significant given the projects that historians typically pursue, they 
may create problems in the context of the originalist project of 
recovering the communicative content of the constitutional text. 
One might equate “law office history” with the method of 
studying the constitutional record and “history-common-room law” 
with the originalist method of immersion, but these simplifications 
are not correct on either score. 
The originalist method of immersion, properly understood, has a 
specific structure. This structure flows from the target at which the 
method is aimed—recovery of the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text. Originalist immersion aims to recover the 
communicative competence of a competent speaker of American 
English at the time a given constitutional provision was framed and 
ratified, and relatedly to recover the competences of the members of 
the linguistic subcommunities that employed the technical language 
and terms of art that appear in the constitutional text (e.g., “Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal”). It is possible that some historians have 
this aim, but typically that is not the case. Immersion by historians 
can aim at any number of goals—uncovering the political and 
ideological motives of historical actors, recreating the life world of 
particular groups (e.g., working-class women, slaves, or recent 
immigrants), and so forth. These aims are radically different. 
Immersion in the life world of recent German immigrants in the late 
eighteenth century is obviously a poor way to recover the 
communicative competence of speakers of American English during 
that same period. The originalist practice of immersion is not 
identical with “history common room law.” 
Likewise, the method of studying the constitutional record of 
framing, ratification, and implementation is not identical to “law 
office history.” A preliminary distinction is important. The method 
of studying the constitutional record can be practiced by different 
kinds of actors, including judges, law clerks, lawyers, legal scholars, 
and scholars in other disciplines, including history and political 
science. These different categories of actors are importantly different 
in many respects. 
Law clerks (so-called “elbow clerks”) typically serve for one or 
two years. Their examination of the historical record would be likely 
to focus on those aspects of the record that are directly relevant to 
the case to which they assigned, perhaps in connection with writing a 
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bench memorandum or drafting an opinion. Typically, bench memos 
must be written in a fairly short period of time—perhaps a few days 
but a few weeks at most. The drafting of an opinion may extend for 
several weeks or a few months, but it is rare for the writing of an 
opinion to approach (and much less exceed) a single calendar year. 
These time constraints have implications for the breadth and depth 
of research that law clerks can conduct. Likewise, lawyers are subject 
to time constraints, but they are also obligated to advocate for their 
client—and this role may encourage “cherry picking,” especially 
given the very strict limits on the length of briefs allowed by the 
rules of court. Judges and law clerks are obligated to fairly consider 
the arguments of both sides, but once a decision has been made, 
there may be a tendency to emphasize the evidence that supports the 
decision and to ignore or discount evidence on the other side; 
dissenting or concurring opinions, if they are written, may prompt 
consideration of contrary evidence, but there is no guarantee that 
this will occur. 
Legal scholars are in a different position. A research project, even 
if limited in scope to a particular issue concerning a particular clause, 
may involve many years of research—decades in some cases. In 
practice, there is no bright line between the method of immersion 
and the method of studying the constitutional record. The most 
extensive research undertaken by legal scholars who practice the 
method of studying the constitutional record will approximate the 
research undertaken by scholars who practice the method of 
immersion. Research of this kind involves an internal process of 
supplementation and checking—immersion in texts surrounding the 
constitutional record are part of the process of studying the 
record  itself. 
When the two methods diverge, the supplementation and 
checking function may be performed by comparing and contrasting 
the results reached by practitioners of each method. Studying the 
constitutional record without immersion might result in a 
misunderstanding of the record itself for the reasons that have 
already been discussed. Similarly, the method of immersion could be 
practiced in a way that does not pay sufficient attention to the 
constitutional record—failing to recognize the importance of 
evidence drawn from the constitutional record of framing, 
ratification, and implementation. 
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D. Consilience as the Aim of the Method of Triangulation 
There can be no a priori guarantees that the Method of 
Triangulation will produce agreement. It is at least possible that the 
results of corpus linguistics will be inconsistent with those produced 
by immersion and that immersion will call into question the results 
derived from study of the constitutional record. Nonetheless, the 
corollary of this observation is equally important: we cannot rule out 
in advance the possibility of consilience. Triangulation of corpus 
linguistics, immersion, and the constitutional record may produce a 
set of mutually supportive findings. Where consilience emerges from 
the application of all three methods and is reinforced by replication 
of each of the individual methods by independent researches, we 
would have very good reason to be confident in our conclusions 
regarding the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
“Replicated consilience” should be the gold standard of origin-
alist  research. 
A lessor degree of confidence would attach to other scenarios. 
For example, where two of the methods agree, but a third is 
inconclusive, we might ultimately reach the conclusion that the 
results of the two methods provide the best available evidence of 
original meaning—even though that evidence does not have the 
same high degree of confidence as does consilience. More disturbing 
would be scenarios where the results of one of the three methods 
contradicts the results derived from the other methods. In some 
cases, such disagreement may be explained. For example, if 
immersion and the constitutional record suggests that a particular 
word should be understood as a modulation of the conventional 
semantic meaning,96 then corpus evidence that supports the 
conventional meaning would be explained in a way that would 
dissolve the seeming contradiction. We can use the phrase 
“partial  consilience” to designate scenarios in which there is 
partial  agreement between methods and residual disagreement 
is  explainable. 
 
 96.  As explained supra Sections IV.D, VII.A, the word “recess” in the Recess 
Appointments Clause might be a modulation of the conventional semantic meaning of recess. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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Finally, there may be cases in which conflicts between the 
methods might not be explainable. Where even partial consilience is 
absent, there may be substantial uncertainty about the original 
meaning of the constitutional text. In such cases, the allocation of 
the burden of persuasion might be essential for the practical 
resolution of a constitutional controversy.97 For example, we might 
evaluate the conflicting evidence and conclude that one 
interpretation of the text is supported by the “weight of the 
evidence”—lawyers use phrases like “preponderance of the evidence” 
or “clear and convincing evidence” to describe the burdens of 
persuasion that operate in resolving evidentiary conflicts. 
VIII. FROM TRIANGULATION TO TRANSLATION 
The Method of Triangulation uses corpus linguistics, immersion, 
and the constitutional record to discover the original public meaning 
of the constitutional text. This means that the primary focus of 
originalist methodology is the text itself. One way to think about this 
activity is via an analogy with translation. The ultimate aim of 
originalist methodology is to translate the constitutional provisions 
written in the American English of the period in which each 
provision was written into contemporary American English. In many 
cases, the analogy of translation is misleading—because 
contemporary American English overlaps substantially, even with the 
American English of the late eighteenth century. When it comes to 
the provision that was drafted most recently, the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, it seems likely that there is virtually no divergence with 
respect to semantics and if there are substantively significant 
contextual enrichments, they are not apparent to me.98 
 
 97.  See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2017). 
 98.   
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of age. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate  legislation. 
Without doing careful analysis, it appears to this author that all of the words and 
phrases in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment are comprehensible to a modern audience. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §§ 1–2. 
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We might represent the movement from triangulation to 
translation via the following diagram:  
 
 
We read the text having considered the results yielded by the 
methods of corpus linguistics, immersion, and study of the 
constitutional record. Taking all three approaches into account, we 
then translate the provision at issue from the language of the relevant 
period into contemporary language. That translation is the “original 
meaning of the constitutional text” as expressed in contemporary 
American English. The translation represents the propositions 
expressed by the original text in the meaning of the original period 
in a modern text (a gloss). The translation is accurate if and only if 
the propositions expressed in the constitutional text are identical to 
the propositions expressed in the gloss. 
The word proposition is being used in a technical sense. 
Propositions are to sentences as concepts are to words. Just as the 
same word law expresses a concept that can be represented by 
different words in other languages (recht in German, loi in French), 
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be  represented in contemporary American English or another 
natural  language.99 
A further step is required to translate the communicative content 
of the text into the legal content of constitutional doctrine. 
Determining communicative content is “interpretation,” whereas the 
specification of legal content is “construction.” The Constraint 
Principle requires judges (or other constitutional actors) to craft 
doctrines that are consistent with the original public meaning. If the 
communicative content of the constitutional text fully determines 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine, the process of 
constitutional construction may be simple and direct. But if the 
communicative content underdetermines legal content, then the 
relevant constitutional actors may be required to craft implementing 
rules—as specified by a theory of constitutional construction.100 
IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD OF TRIANGULATION 
Implementation of the Method of Triangulation is itself a large 
topic. Here I will express a few tentative thoughts about the steps 
that would need to be taken in order to put the Method of 
Triangulation into effect. 
A. Triangulation and the Division of Intellectual Labor 
For readers who are already familiar with the methods of 
originalist research, it will be apparent that full implementation of 
the Method of Triangulation is a large task. No one individual could 
complete the task of applying all three methods to the full text of the 
U.S. Constitution in a single lifetime; indeed, for many of the 
Constitution’s articles and clauses, it seems likely that it is not 
feasible for a single individual to do all the work necessary to apply 
 
 99.  See Matthew McGrath, Propositions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ (last updated June 20, 2012); Eric Margolis & Stephen 
Laurence, Concepts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/concepts/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 100.  See generally Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 12 (discussing 
originalist approaches to constitutional construction). For a recent example of an originalist 
theory of constitutional construction, see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter 
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism (Oct. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056). 
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the Method of Triangulation. The likelihood that this is true 
strongly suggests that implementation of the Method of 
Triangulation will require a division of intellectual labor. 
We might speculate that some scholars will specialize in each of 
the three methods—with some scholars doing corpus linguistics 
work, while others practice the methods of immersion and studying 
the constitutional record. It is also imaginable that some scholars 
would master more than one of the methods, for example, 
employing both corpus linguistics and study of the constitutional 
record, while achieving some degree of immersion as well. 
Scholarship that employs the Method of Triangulation might be co-
authored, with an empiricist executing the corpus linguistics portion 
of the article and others deploying the methods of immersion and 
study of the constitutional record. 
B. Triangulation and Interdisciplinary and 
Multidisciplinary Scholarship 
Another dimension of the Method of Triangulation is that it 
requires some degree of interdisciplinary collaboration combined 
with multidisciplinary training for legal scholars. For example, legal 
scholars could collaborate with linguistics scholars in the design of 
corpora and corpus linguistic methods for the investigation of legal 
texts. Legal scholars might collaborate with historians and political 
scientists trained in the American political development tradition in 
designing research programs for implementation of the method of 
immersion. Similarly, we might imagine a multidisciplinary training 
program for originalist scholars that involves the study of linguistics, 
philosophy of language, corpus linguistics, constitutional history, 
and  historiography. 
C. Triangulation in the Courts 
Finally, there is the question as to how the Method of 
Triangulation can be employed in the courts. Certainly, judges and 
their law clerks can employ the method of studying the historical 
record directly: this method is familiar to sophisticated lawyers and 
judges. The pioneering efforts of Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah 
Supreme Court and Justice Joan Larsen of the Michigan Supreme 
Court demonstrate that judges and law clerks can learn to employ 
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the method of corpus linguistics. It is obvious, however, that the 
method of immersion will be inconsistent with the career path and 
duties of most judges, lawyers, and law clerks. 
For this reason, it seems likely that implementation of the 
Method of Triangulation will involve the production of originalist 
scholarship in the academy with consumption of that scholarship by 
the courts. For this to work well, lawyers, judges, and judicial clerks 
will need to be familiar with the Method of Triangulation and its 
constituent elements. It is even imaginable that courts of last resort, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court and the highest courts of the 
several states would employ professionals trained in corpus linguistics 
or immersed in particular historical periods to produce sophisticated 
in-house evaluations of the originalist claims made in briefs and in 
legal scholarship. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalism as a constitutional theory has evolved substantially 
since the word originalism was coined by Paul Brest in 1980.101 The 
emphasis on the original intentions of the framers has given way to 
forms of originalism focused on public meaning, original methods, 
and original law. Applied originalism has flourished, with so many 
articles and monographs that compiling a catalog would be a 
daunting task. But despite the flourishing of originalist theory and 
practice, method has lagged behind. The aim of this Article is to 
initiate a conversation about originalist methodology and to make 
tentative suggestions about an approach that promises objective and 
transparent methods that aim at convergent answers to questions 
about the original meaning of the constitutional text. The Method 
of Triangulation aims at consilience—agreement between the 
methods of corpus linguistics, immersion, and study of the 
constitutional record. 
Where consilience between the methods of corpus linguistics, 
immersion, and study of the constitutional record is achieved and 
replicated, we can be reasonably confident that we have recovered 
 
 101.  Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 234 (1980). 
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the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The recovery 
of original public meaning may be difficult, and in some cases 
impossible, but the Method of Triangulation combined with 
replication provides the ideal to which originalists can aspire. 
